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ARGUMENT.
Jifr. President and Gentlemen of the Commission:
Has the Commission jurisdiction of the cases before it, is the question
which I propose to discuss. That question, in all courts, civil, criminal,
and military, must be considered and answered affirmatively before judgment can be pronounced. And it must be answered correctly, or the judgment pronounced is void. Ever an interesting and vital inquiry, it is of
engrossing interest and of awful importance when error may lead to the
unauthorized taking of human life. In such a case, the court called upon
to render, and the officer who is to approve its judgment anj:l have it executed, have a concern peculiar to themselves. As to each, a responsibility
is involved which, however conscientiously and firmly met, is calculated and
cannot fail to awaken great solicitude and induce the most mature consideration. The nature of the duty is such that even honest error nffords no
impunity. The legal personal consequences, even in a case of l1oncst,
mistaken judgment, cannot be avoided. That this is no exaggeration,
the Commission will, I think, be satisfied before I shall have concluded.
I refer to it now, and shall ngaiu, with no ,icw to shake your firmness.
Such an attempt would be alike discourteous and unprofitable. Every
member comprising the Commission will, I am sure, meet all the responsibility that belongs to it as becomes gentlemen and soltlicrs. I therefore
repeat that my sole object in adverting to it is to obtain a well considered
and matured judgment. So far the question of jurisdiction has not been
discussed. The pleas which specially present it, as soon as filed, were
overruled. But that will not, because properly it should not, prevent
your considering it with the deliberation that its grave nature demands.
And it is for you to decide it, and at this time for you alone. '!.'he commission you arc acting under of itself does not and could not decide it.
If unauthorized it is a mere nullity-the usurpation cla power not vested
in the Executive, and conferring no authority whatever upon you. To
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hold otherwise would be to make the Executive the exclusive and conclusive judge of its own powers, and that would be to make that department
omnipotent. The powers of the President under the Constitution are
great, and amply sufficient to give all needed efficiency to the office. The
convention that formed the Constitution, and the people who adopted it,
· considered those powers sufficient, and granted no others. In the minds
of both (anu subsequent history has served to strengthen the impression)
danger to liberty was more to be dreaded from the Executive than from
any other department of the Government. So far, therefore, from meaning to extend its powers beyond what was deemed necessary to the wholesome operation of the Government, they were studious to place them
beyond the reach of abuse. With this view, before entering "on the execution of his office," the President is required to take an oath "faithfnlly"
to discharge its duties, and to the best of his "ability preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States." He is also liable to
"be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." If he violates the
Constitution; if he fails to preserve it; and, above all, if he usurps
powers not granted, he is false to his official oath, and liable to be indicted and convicted, and to be impeached. For such an offence, his removal from office is the necessary consequence. In such a contingency,
"he shall be removed" is the command of the Constitution. What
stronger evidence could there be that his powers, all of them, in peace
and in war, are only such as the Constitution confers ? But if this was
not evident from the instrument itself, the character of the men "ho composed the Convention, and the spirit of the American people at that
period, would prove it. Hatred of a monarchy, made the more intense
by the conduct of the monarch from whose government they had recently
sepai;ated, and a deep-seated love of constitutional liberty, made the more
keen and active by the sacrifices which had illustrated their revolutionary
career, constituted them a people who could never be induced to delegate
any executive authority not so carefully restricted and guarded as to render its abuse or usurpation almost impossible. If these observations are
well founded-and I suppose they will not be denied-it follows that an
executive act beyond executive authority can fnrnish no defence against
the legal consequences of what is done under it. I have said that the
question of juricdiction is ever open. It may be raised by counsel at any
stage of the trial, and if it is not, the Court not only may, but is bound
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to notice it. Unless jurisdiction then exists, the authority to try does not
exist, and whatever is done is "corarn non judice," and utterly void.
This doctrine is as applicable to military as to other courts.
O'BRIEN tells us that the question may be raised by demurrer if the
facts charged do not constitute an offence, or if they do, not an offence
cognizable by a military court, or that it may be raised by a special plea,
or under the general one of not guilty.-O'Brien, 248.
DEHART says: The court "is the judge of its own competency at any
stage of its proceedings, and is bound to notice questions of jurisdiction
whenever raised. "-DeHart IIL
The question then being always open, and its proper decision essential
to the validity of its judgment, the Commission must decide before pronouncing such judgment whether it has jurisdiction over these parties and
the crimes imputed to them. That a tribunal like this has no jurisdiction
over other than military offences, is believed to be self-evident. That
offences defined and punished by the civil law, and whose trial is provided for
by the same law, are not the subjects of military jurisdiction, is of course
true. .A military, as contradistinguished from a civil offence, must therefore be made to appear, and when it is, it must also appear that the
military Jaw provides for its trial and punishment by a military tribunal.
If that Jaw does not furnish a mode of trial, or affix a punishment, the
case is unprovided for, and, as far as the military power is concerned, is
to go unpunished. But as either the civil, common, or statute Jaw
embraces every species of offence that the United States, or the States
have deemed it necessary to punish, in all snch cases the civil courts arc
clothed with every necessary jurisdiction. In a military court, if the
charge does not state a "crime provided for generally or specifically by
any of the articles of war," the p]jisouer must be discharged. (O'Brien,
p. 235.) Nor is it sufficient that the charge is of a crime known to the
military law. The offender, when he commits it, must be subject to such
law, or he is not subject to military jurisdiction. The general Jaw has
"supreme and undisputed jurisdiction over all. The military law puts
forth no such pretensions; it aims solely to enforce on the soldier the
additional duties he has assumed . It constitutes tribunals for the trial of
breaches of military duty only." (O'Brien, 26, 27.) "The one code
(the civil) embraces all citizens, whether soldiers or not; the other (the
military) has no jurisdiction over any citizen as such." Ibid.
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The provisions of the Constitution clearly maintain the same doctrine.
The Executive has no authority "to declare war, to raise and support
o.rmies, to provide and maintain a navy," or to make "rules for the government and regulation" of either force. These powers are exclusively
in Congress. An army cannot be raised or have law for its government
and regulation except as Congress shall provide. This power of Congress to govern and regulate the army and navy, was granted by the convention without objection. In England, the King, as the generalissimo
of the whole kingdom, bas this sole power, though Parliament has frequently interposed and regulated for itself. But with us, it was thought
safest to give the entire power tp Congress, "since otherwise summary
and severe punishments might be inflicted at the mere will of the Executive." (3 Stoi·y's Com., sect. 1192.) No member of the Convention, or
any commentator on the Constitution since, bas intimated that even this
Congressional power could be applied to citizens not belonging to the
army or navy. In respect, too, to the latter class, the power was conferred exclusively on Congress to prevent that class being made the object
of abuse by the Executive-to guard them especially from " summary and
severe punishments" inflicted by mere Executive will. The existence of
such a power being vital to discipline, it was necessary to provide for it.
But no member suggested that it should be or could be made to apply to
citizens not in the military or naval service, or be given to any other
department, in whole or in part, than Congress. Citizens not belonging
to the army or navy were not made liable to military law, or under any
circumstances to be deprived of any of the guaranties of personal liberty
provided by the Constitution. Independent of the consideration that
the very nature of the Government is inconsistent with such a pretension,
the power is conferred upon Congress in terms that exclude all who do
not belong to "the ln,nd and naval forces." It is a rule of interpretation
coeval with its existence, that the Government, in no department of it,
possesses powers not granted by express delegation or necessarily to be
implied from those that arc granted. This would be the rule incident to
the very nature of the Constitution; but to place it beyond doubt, and to
make it an imperative rule, the 10th amendment declares that "the powers
not delegated to the United States by tlw Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, a1·e reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
The power given to Congress, "is to make rnles for the government and
regnlation of the land and naval forces." No artifice of ingenuity can
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make these words include those who do not belong to the army and navy;
and they are therefore to be construed to exclude all others, as if negative
words to that effect had been added. A.nd this is not only the obvious
meaning of the terms, considered by themselves, but is demonstrable from
other provisions of the Constitution. So jealous were our ancestors of
ungranted power, and so vigilant to protect the citizen against it, that
they were unwilling to leave him to the safe guards which a proper construction of the Constitution, as orignally adopted, furnished. In this
they resolved that nothing should be left in doubt. 'rtrny determined,
therefore, not only to guard him against executive and judicial, but
against Congressional abuse. With that view, they adopted the fifth
constitutional amendment, which declares that "no person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury, EXCEPT in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the rnilitia when in active service in time of war or
public danger." This exception is designed to leave in force, not to
enlarge the power vested in Congress by the · original Constitution, "to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces." "The land or naval forces" are the terms used in both, have
the same meaning, and until lately, have been supposed by every commentator and judge, to exclude from military jurisdiction offences committed
by citizens not belonging to such forces. KENT, in a note to his 1 Corns.,
p. 341, states, and with accuracy, that "military and naval crimes, and
offences committed while the party is attached to and under the immediate
authority of the army and navy of the United States and in actnal service,
arc not cognizable under the common law jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States." According to this great authority, every other class of
persons and every other species of offence, are within the jurisdiction of
the civil courts, and entitled to the protection of the proceeding by presentment or indictment, and a public trial in such a court. If the constitutional amendment has not that effect, if it does not secure that protection
to all who do not belong to the army or navy, then the provisions in the
sixth amendment are equally inoperative. They, "in all criminal prosecutions," give the accused a right to a speedy and public trial; a right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to compulsory process for his witnesses,
and the assistance of counsel. The exception in the 5th amendment of
cases arising in the land or naval forces applies by necessary implication,
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at least in part, to this. To construe this as not containing the exception
would defeat the purpose of the exception ; for the provisions of the 6th
amendment, unless they are subject to the exceptions of the !1th, would
be inconsistent with the 5th. The 6th is therefore to be construed as if
it in words contained the exception. It is submitted that this is evident.
The consequence is, that if the exception can be made to include those
who, in the language of Kent, are not, when the offence was committed,
"attached to and under the immediate authority of the army or naYy, and
in actual service," the securities designed for other citizens by the 6th
article arc wholly nugatory. If a military commission, created by the
mere authority of the President, can deprive a citizen of the benefit of the
guaranties secured by the 5th amendment, it can deprive him of those
secured by the 6th. It may deny him the right to a "speedy and public
trial," information "of the nature and cause of the accusation," of the
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," of '' compulsory
process for his witnesses," and of "the assistance of counsel for his
defence." That this can be done no one has as yet maintained; no
opinion, however latitudinarian, of executive power, of the effect of public
necessity, in war or in peace, to enlarge its sphere, and authorize a disregard of its limitations ; no one, however convinced he may be of the
policy of protecting accusing witnesses from a public examination, under
the idea that their testimony cannot otherwise be obtained, and that crime
may consequently go unpunished, has to this time been found to go to
that extent. Certainly, no writer has ever maintained such a doctrine.
Argument to refute it, is unnecessary. It refutes itself. For, if sound,
the 6th amendment, which our fathers thought so vital to individual
liberty when assailed by governmental prosecution, is but a dead letter,
totally iucmcient for its purpose whenever the Government shall deem it
proper to try a citizen by a military commission. Against such a doctrine
the very i11stincts of freemen revolt. It has no foundation but in the
principle of unrestrained, tyrannic power, and passive obedience. If it be
well founded, then arc we indeed a nation of slaves, and not of freemen.
If the Executive can legally decide whether a citizen is to enjoy the
guaranties of liberty afforded by the Constitution, what arc we but slaves ?
If the President, or ar,y of his subordinates, upon any pretence whatever,
can deprive a citizen of such guaranties, liberty with us, howercr Joyed, is
not enjoyed. But the Constitution is not so fatally defectirn. It is
suLject to no such reproach. In war and in peace, it is equally potential
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for the promotion of the general welfare, and as involved in and necessary
to such welfare, for the protection of the individual citizen. Certainly,
until this rebellion, this has been the prond and cherished conviction of
the country. .And it is to this conviction and the assurance that it could
never be shaken that our past prosperity is to be referred. God forbid
that mere power, dependent for its exercise on Executive will, (a condition
destructive of political and social happiness,) shall ever be substituted in
its place. Should that unfortunately ever occur, unless it was soon
conectcd by the authority of the people, the objects of our Revolutionary
struggle, the sacrifices of our ancestors, and the design of the Constitution
will all have been in vain.
I proceed now to examine with somewhat of particularity the grounds
on which I am informed your jurisdiction is maintained.
1st. Tliat it is au incident of the war power.

I. That power, whatever be its extent, is exclusively in Congress. War
can only he declared by that body. With its origin the President has no
concern whatever. Armies, when necessary, can only be raised by the
same body. Not a soldier, without its authority, can be brought into
service by the Executive. Ile is as impotent to that end us a private citizen. And armies, too, when raised by Congressional authority, can only
be governed and regulated by "mies" prescribed by the same authority.
The Executive possesses no power over the soldier except such as Congress may, by legislation, confer upon him. If, then, it was true that the
creation of a military commission like the present is incidental to the war
power, it must be authorized by tile department to which that power belongs, and not by the Executive, to whom no portion of it belongs. .And
if it be said to be involved in the power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and nn.val forces," the result is the same.
It must be done by Congress, to wliom that power also exclusively belongs, and not by the Executive. Ilas Congress, then, under eitlier
power, authorized such a commission as this to try such cases as these?
It is confidently asserted that it has not. If it has, let the statute be
produced. It is certainly not done by that of the 10th of .April, 1806,
"establishing articles for the go,·ernment of the armies of the United
States." No military courts are there mentioned or provided for but
courts-martial and courts of inquiry. And tlieir mode of appointment

•
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and organization, and of proceeding, and the authority vested in them
are also prescribed. Military commissions are not 011ly not authorized,
but are not even alluded to. And, consequently, the parties, wl10ever
these may be, who, under that act, can be tried by courts-martial or
courts of inquiry, are not made subject to trial by a military commission.
Nor is such a tribunal mentioned in any prior statute, or in any 8ubscquent one, until those of the l '7th of July, 1862, and of the 3d of March,
1863. In the 5th section of the first, the records of "military commissions are to be returned for revision to the Judge Advocate -General,"
whose appointment it also provides for. But how such commissions arc
to be constituterl, what powers they are to have, how their proceedings
arc to be conducted, or what cases and parties they are to try, is not provided for. In the 38th section of the second, they are mentioned as competent to try persons "lurking or acting as spies." The same absence in
the particulars stated in respect to the first arc trnc of this. And as
regards this act of 1863, this reflection forcibly presents itself. If military commissions can be created, and from their very nature possess jurisdiction to try all alleged military offences, (the ground on which your
jurisdiction, it is said, in part rests,) why was it necessary to give them
the power, by express words, to try persons "lurking or acting as spies?"
The military character of such an offence could not have been doubted .
What reason, then, can be suggestd for conferring the power by express
language than that without it it wo.uld not be posse.ssed? Before these
statutes a commission, called a military commission, had been issued by
the Executive to Messrs. Davis, Ilolt, and Campbell, to examine into certain military claims against the Western Department, and Congress, by
its resolution of the 11th of March, 1862, (No. 18,) provided for the payment of its awards. Against a commission of that character no objection
can be made. It is but ancilliary to the auditing of demands upon the
Government, and in no way interferes with any eonstitutional right of the
citizen. But until this rebellion a military commission like the present,
organized in a loyal State or Territory where the courts arc open and
their proceedings unobstructed, clothed with the jurisdiction attempted to
be conferred upon you-a jurisdiction involving not only the liberty, but
the lives of the parties on trial-it is confidently stated, is not to be found
sanctioned, or the most remotely recognized, or even alluded to, by any
writer on military law in England or the United States, or in any legislation of either country. It has its origin in the rebeJl:on, and like the

•
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dangerous heresy of secession, out of which that sprung, nothing is more
certain in my opinion than that, however pure the motives of its origin, it
will be considered, as it is, an almost equally dangerous heresy to constitutional liberty, and the rebellion ended, perish with the other, then and
forever. But to proceed; guch commissions were authorized by Lieutenant General Scott in his Mexican campaign. When he obtained possession of the City of :Mexico, he on the 17th of September, 1847, republished, with additions, his order of the 19th of February preceding, declaring martial law. By this order, he authorized the trial of certain offences
by military commissions, regulated their proceedings, and limited the punishments they might inflict. From their jurisdiction, however, he excepts
cases "clearly cognizable by court-martial," and in words limits the cases
to be tried to such as arc (I quote) "not provided for in the act of Congress establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of
the United States," of the 10th of April, 1806. The second clause of
the order mentions, among other offences to be so tried, "assassination,
murder, poisoning;" and in the fourth ( correctly, as I submit, with all
respect for a contrary opinion,) he states that "the rules and articles of
war" do not pro,·ide for the punishment of any one of the desig11ated
offences, "even wl~n committecl by individuals of the army upon the persons or property of other individuals· of the same, except in the very
restricted case in the 9th of the articles." The authority, too, for even
this restricted commission-ScoTT-not more eminent as soldier than
civilian-placed entirely upon the ground that the named _offences, if committed in a foreign country by American troops, could not be punished
under any law of the United States then in force. "The Constitution of
the United States and the rules and articles of war," he said, and said
correctly, provided no court for their trial or punishment, "no matter by
whom, or on whom" committed.-Scott's Autobiography, 392.
And he further tells ns that even this order, so limited ~and so called for
by the greatest public necessity, when handed to the then Secretary of
War (1Ir. l\Iarcy) "for his approval,"" a startle at the title (martial law
order) was the only comment he then, or ever, made on the subject," and
that it was "soon silently returned as too explosive for safe handling."
"A little later (he adds) the Attorney General (Mr. Cushing) called and
asked for a copy, and the law officer of the Government, whose business
itis to speak on all such matters, was stricken with legal dumbness," (lb.)
How much more startled and more paralyzed would these great men have
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been had they been consulted on such a commission as this !-a commisi-ion not to sit in another country, and to try offences not provided for by
any law of tl.ie United States, civil or military, but in their own cou11try,
and in a part of it where there are laws providing for their trial and puRishment, and civil courts clothed with ample powers for both, and in the
daily and undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction ; and where, if there
should be an attempt at disturbance by a force which they had not the
power to control, they could invoke (and it would be his duty to afford it)
the President to use the military power at his command, and which everybody knows to be ample for the purp•JSC.
If it be suggested that the civil courts and juries for this District could
not safely be relied upon for the trial of these cases, because either of incompetency, disloyalty, or corruption, it would be an unjust reflection
upon the judges, upon the people, upon the :Marshal, an appointee of the
President, by whom the juries are summoned, and upon our civil institutions
thcmseh·es-upon the very institutions on whose integrity and intelligence
the safety of our property, liberty, and lives, our ancestors thought, could
not only be safely rested, but would be safe nowhere else. If it be suggested that a secret trial, in whole or in part, as the Executive might deem
expedient, could not be had before any other than a military tribunal, the
answer is that the Constitution, "in all criminal prosecutions," gives the
accused" the right" to a" public trial." So abhorrent were private trials
to our ancestors, so fatal did they deem them to individual security, that they
were thus denounced, and, as they no doubt thought, so guarded against
as in all future time to be impossible. If it be suggested that witnesses
may be unwilling to testify, the answer is, that they may be compelled to
appear and made to testify.
Bnt the suggestion, upon another ground, is equally without force. It
rests on the idea that the guilty only arc ever brought to trial-that the
only object of the Constitution and laws in this regard is to afford the
means to establish alleged guilt, that accusation, however made, is to be
esteemed prima facie, evidence of guilt, and that the Executive should
be armed without other restriction than his own discretion, with all the
appliances deemed by him necessary to make the presumption from such
evidence conclusive. Never was there a more dangerous theory. The
peril to the citizen from a prosecution so conducted, as illustrated in all
history-is so great that the very elementary principles of constitutional
liberty, the spirit and letter of the Constitution itself repudiate it.
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II. Innocent parties, sometimes by private malice, sometimes for a mere
partisan purpose, sometimes from a supposed public policy, have been
made the subjects of criminal accusation. llistory is full of such instances.
How are such parties to be protected if a public trial, at the option of the
Executive, can be denied them, and a secret one, in whole or iu part,
substituted ? If the names of the witnesses and their evidence arc not
published, what obstacle does it not interpose to establish their innocence?
The character of the witnesses against them may be all important to that
end. Kept in prison, with no means of consulting the outer world, how
can they make the necessary inquiries? How can those who may know the
witnesses be able to communicate with them on the subject? A trial so conducted, though it may not-as no doubt is the case in the present instance,
be intended to procure the punishment of any but the guilty, it is obvious
subjects the innocent to great danger. It partakes more of the character
of the Inquisition, which the enlightened civilization of the age has driven
almost wholly out of existence, than of a tribunal suited lo a free people.
In the palmiest days of that tribunal, kings as well as people stood
abashed in its presence, and dreaded its power. The accused was never
informed of the names of his accusers, heresy suspected was ample ground
for arrest, accomplices and criminals were received as witnesses, and the
whole trial was secret and conducted in a chamber almost as silent as the
grave. It was long since denounced by the civilized world, not because
it might not at times punish the heretic, (thet}, in violation of all rightful
human power, deemed a criminal,) but because it was as likely to punish
the innocent as the guilty. A public trial, therefore, by which the names
of witnesses and the testimony are gireu, even in monarchical and despotic
governments, is now esteemed amply adequate to the punishment of guilt,
ar.d essential to the protection of innocence. Can it be that this is not
true of ns? Can it be that a secret trial, wholly or partially, if the
Executive so decides, is all that an Am<lrican citizen is entitled to ? Such
a doctrine, if maintained by an English monarch, would shake his government to its very centre, and, if persevered in, would losb him his crown.
It will be no answer to these observations to say that this particular trial
has been only in part a secret one, and that sccrcsy will never be rcrnrted
to except for purposes of justice. The reply is, that the principle itself is
inconsistent with American liberty, as recognized and secured by constitntional guaranties. It supposes that whether these guaranties are lo be
enjoyed in the particular case, and to what extent, is dependent on Execu•
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tive will. The Constitution in this regard, is designed to secure them in
spite of such will. Its patriotic authors intended to place the citizen, in
this particular, wholly beyond the power, not only of the Executive, but
of every department of the Government. '!.'hey deemed the right to a
public trial vital to the security of the citizen, and especially and absolutely necessary to his protection again~t Executive power. A public
trial of all criminal prosecutions they therefore secured by general and
unqualified terms. What would these great men have said, had they
been asked so to qualify the terms as to warrant its refusal under any circumstances, and make it dependent upon Executive discretion? The
member who made the inquiry would have been deemed by them a traitor
to liberty, or insane. What would they have said if told that without
such qualification, the Executive would be able legally to impose it as
incidental to Executive power? If not received with derisiou, it would
have been indignantly rejected as an imputation upon those who, at any
time thereafter, should legally fill the office.
III. Let me present the question in another view. If such a Commission as this, for the trial of cases like the present, can be legally constituted, can it be done by mere Executive authority?
1. You are a Court, and, if legally existing, endowed with momentous
power, the highest known to man, that of passing upon the liberty or life
of the citizen. By the express words of the Constitution, an army can
only be raised and governed and regulated by laws passed by Congress.
In the exercise of the power to rule and govern it, the act before referred
to, of the 10th of April, 180G, establishing the articles of war, was passed.
That act provides only for courts-martial and courts of inquiry, and
designates the cases to be tried before each, and the laws that arc to
govern the trial. Military commissions arc not mentioned, and, of course,
the act contains no provision for their government. Now, it is submitted
as perfectly clear that the creation of a court, whether civil or military, is
an cxclusiv.e legislative function belonging to the department npon which
the legislative power is conferred. The jurisdiction of such a court, and
the laws and regulations to guide and govern it, is also exclusively legislative. What cases are to be tried by it, how the judges are to be
selected, and how qualified, what are to be the rules of evidence, and
what punishments are to be inflicted, all solely belong to the same dep.art-
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ment. The very element of constitutional liberty, recognized by all
modern writers on government as essential to its security, and carefully incorporated into our Constitution, is a separation of the legislative, judicial,
and executive powers. That this separation is made in our Constitution,
no one will deny. Article 1st declares that "All legislative powers h~rein
granted shall be vested in a Congress." Article 2d vests "the Executive
power" in a President, and Article 3d, "the judicial power" in certain
designated courts and in courts to be thereafter constituted by Congress.
There could not be a more careful segregation of the three powers. If,
then, courts, their laws, modes of proceeding, and judgments, belong to
legislation, ( and this, I suppose, will not be questioned,) in the absence of
legislation in regard to this court and its jurisdiction to try the present
cases, it has for that purpose no legal existence or authority. The Executive, whose functions are altogether executive, cannot confer it. The
offences to be tried by it, the laws to govern its proceedings, the punishment it may award, cannot, for the same reason, be prescribed by the
Executive. These, as well as the mere constitution of the Court, all exclusively belong to Congress. If it be contended that the Executive has
the powers in question, because by implication they are involved in the
war power, or in the President's con,titutional function as cornrnander-inchief of the army, then this consequence would follow, that they would
not be subject to Congressional control, as that department has no more
right to interfere with the constitutional power of the Executive than that
power has a right to interfere with that of Congress. If by implication
the powers in question belong to the Executive, he may not only constitute and regulate military commissions and prescribe the laws for their
government, but all legislation upon the subject by Congress wonld be
usurpation. That the proposition leads to this result would seem to be
clear, and if it does, that result itself is so inconsistent with all previous
legislation and all executive practice, and so repugnant to every principle
of constitutional liberty, that it demonstrates its utter unsoundness.
Under the power given to Congress "to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land" forces, they have from time to time, up to
and including the act of the 10th of April, 1806, and since, enacted such
rules as they deemed to be necessary, as well in war as in peace, and their
authority to do so has never been denied. This power, too, to govern
and regulate, from its very nature, is exclusive. Whatever is not done
under it is to be considered as purposely omitted. The words used in
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the delegation of the power, "govern and regulate," necessarily embrace
the entire subject and exclude all like authority in others. 'l'he end of
such a power cannot be attained except throngh uniformity of government and regulation, and this is not to be attained if the power is in two
hands. To be effective, therefore, it must be in one, and the Constitution
gives it to one-to Congress-in express terms, and nowhere intimates a
purpose to bestow it, or any portion of it, upon any other department.
In the absence, then, of all mention of military commissions in the Constitution, and in the presence of the sole authority it confers on Congress
by rules of its own enacting to govern and regulate the army, and in the
absence of all mention of such commissions in the act of the 10th of
April, 1806, and of a single word in that act or in any other, how can the
power be considered as in the President? Further, upon what ground,
other than those I have examined, can his authority be placed ?
I. Is it that the constitutional guaranties referred to arc designed only
for a state of peace? There is not a syllable in the instrument that justifies, even plausibly, such a qualification. 'l'bcy arc secured by the most
general and comprehensive terms, wholly inconsistent with any restriction .
They are also not only not confined to a condition of peace, but arc more
peculiarly necessary to the security of personal liberty in war than in
peace. .All history tells us that war at times maddens the people, frenzies
government, and makes both regardless of constitutional limitations of
power. Individual safety, at such periods, is more in peril than at any
other. Constitutional limitations and guar~ntics arc then also absolutely
necessary to the protection of the government itself. The maxim, "salus
populi suprema est le:r," is but fit for a tyrant's use. Under its pretence
the grossest wrongs have been committed, the most awful crimes perpetrated, and every principle of freedom violated, until at last, worn down
by suffering, the people, in very despair, have acquiesced in a resulting
despotism. The safety which liberty needs, and without which it sickens
and dies, is that which law, and not mere unlicensed human will, affords.
The .Aristotelian maxim, "Salus publfra supremas est lex"-" Let the
public weal be under the protection of the law," is the true and only safe
maxim. Nature without law would be chaos; government without law,
anarchy or despotism. .Against both these last, in war and in peace, the
Constitutiou happily protects us.
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II. If the power in question is claimed under the authority supposed
to be given the President in certain cases to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and to declare martial law, the claim is equally, if not more evidently untenable.
1. Because the first of these powers, if given to the President at all, is
given "when, in cases of rebellion or invnsiou," he deems the puulic
safety requires it. I think he has this power, but there arc great and patriotic names who think otherwise. But if he has it, or if it be in Congress alone, it is entirely untrue that its exercise works any other result
than the suspension of the writ-the temporary suspension of the right of
having the cause of arrest passed upon at once by the civil judges. It in
no way impairs or suspends the other rights secured to the accused. In
what court he is to be tried, how he is to be tried, what evidence is to be
admitted, and what judgment pronounced arc all to be what the Constitution secures, and the laws provide in similar cases, when there is no suspension of the writ. The purpose of the writ is merely, without delay, to
ascertain the legality of the arrest. If adjudged legal, the party is detained; if illegal, discharged. But in either contingency, when he is
called to answer any criminal accusation, and be is a civilian and not subject to the articles of war constitutionally enacted by Congress, it must be
done by presentment or indictment, and his trial be had in a civil court,
having, by State or Congressional legislation, jurisdiction over the crime
and under laws governing the tribunal and defining the punishment. 'l'he
very fact, too, that express power is given in a certain condition of things
to suspend the writ referred to, and that no power is given to suspend or
deny any of the other securities for personal liberty provided by the Constitution, is conclusive to show that all of the latter were designed to be in
foree "in cases of rebellion or invasion," as well as in a state of perfect
peace and safety.

III. I have already referred to the act of 1806 establishing the articles
of war, and said what must be admitted, that it provides for no military
court like this. But for argument's sake let it be conceded that it does.
And I then maintain, with becoming confidence and due respect for a different opinion, that it does not embrace the crimes charged against these
parties or the parties themselves.
2
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First. The charge is a traitorous conspiracy to take the lives of the
designated persons "in aid of the existing armed rebellion." Second.
'l'hat in the execution of ibe conspiracy, the actual murder of the late
President, and the attempted murder of the Secretary of State, occurred.
Throughout the charge and its specification, the conspiracy and its
attempted execution are alleged to have been traitorous. 'l'he accusation,
therefore, is not one merely of murder, but of murder designed and in
part accomplished, with traitorous purpose. If the charge is true, and
the intent (which is made a substantial part of it) be also trne, then the
crime is treason, and not simple murder. '!'reason against the United
States, as defined by the Constitution, can "consist only in levying war
against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." (III Art.) This definition not only tells us what treason is, but
tells us that no other crime than the defined one shall be considered the
offence. .And the same section provides that "no person shall be convicted of treason, except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act, or on confession in open court," and gives to Congress the
power to declare what its punishment shall be. The offence in the general is the same in England. In that country, at no period since its freedom became settled, bas any other treason been recognized. During the
pendeney of this rebellion, (never before,) it has been alleged that there
exists with us the offence of military treason, punishable by the laws of
war. It is so stated in the instructions of General Halleck to the then
commanding officer in Tennessee, of the 5th of March, 1863.-( Lawrence's Wheaton, Suppt. p. 41.) Bnt Halleck confines it to acts committed aguinst the army of a belligerent, when occupying the territory of
the enemy. .And be says what is certainly true, if such an offence can be
committed, tbut it "is broadly distinguished from the treason defined iu
the constitutional and statutory laws, and made punishable by the ci vii
courts." But the term military treason is not.to be found in any English
work or military order, or, before this rebellion, in any American authority.
It has evidently been adopted during the rebellion as a doctrine of
military law on the authority of continental writers in governments Jess
free than those of England and the United States, and in which, because
they are less free, treason is not made to consist of certain specific acts,
and no others. But if Halleck is right, and all our prior practice, and
that of England, from whom we derive ou.s, is to be abandoned, the
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cases before you are not cases of "military treason," as he defines
it. When the of.fence he.re alleged is stated to have occurred in this
District, the United States were not and did not chiim to be in its
occupation as a belligerent, nor was it pretended that the people of this
District were in a belligerent sense enemies. On the contrary, they were
citizens entitled to every right of citizenship. Nor were the parties on
trial enemies. 'l'hey were either citizens of the District, or of :Maryland,
and under the protection of the Constitution. The of.fence charged, then,
being treason, it is treason as known to the Constitution and laws, and
can only be tried and punished as they provide. 'l'o consider these parties
belligerents, and their alleged offence military treason is not only unwarranted by the authority of Halleck, but is in direct con0ict with the Constitution :rnd laws which the President and all of us are bound to support
and defend. The offence, then, being treason, as known to the Constitution, its trial by a military court is clearly illegal. And this for obvious
reasons. Under the Constitution no conviction of such an offence can be
had, "unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or
on confession in open court." And under the laws the parties are entitled
to have "a copy of the indictment and. a list of the jury and witnesses,
with the names and places of abode of both, at least three entire days
before the trial." They also have the right to challenge peremptorily
thirty-firn of the jury, and to challenge for cause without limitation. And
finally, unless the indictment shall be found. by a grand jury within three
years next after the treason tlone or committed, they shall not be prosecuted, tried, or punished. (Act 30th April, 1790, 1 stat. at large. 118,
119.) Upon what possiLle ground, therefore, can this Commission possess
the jurisdiction claimed for it? It is not alleged that it is subject to the
provisions stated, and in its very nature it is impossible that it should be.
'l'he very safeguards designed by the Constitution, if it has such jnrisdiction, are wholly unavailing. Trial by jury in all cases, our English ancestors deemed (as Story correctly tells us) "the great bulwark of their
civil and political liLcrties, and watched with an unceasiug jealousy and
solicitude." It constituted one of the fundamental articles of .i\fagua
Charla-" Null us liber homo capiatur nee imprisonetur aut exulel, aut
aliquo modo, destruatur, &e.; nisi per legae judzcium parimn suorum,
vel per legem terrea." This great right the American colonists brought
with them as their birth-right and inheritance. It landed with them at
Jamestown and on the rock of Plymouth, and was equally prized by

20
Cavalier and Puritan; and ever since, to the breaking out of the rebellion,
has been enjoyed, and esteemed the protection and proud privilege of
their posterity. At times, during the rebellion, it has been disregarded
and denied. The momentous nature of the crisis, brought about by that
stupendous crime, involving, as it did, the very life of the nation, has
caused the people to tolerate such disregard and denial. But the crisis,
thank Goel, has passed. The authority of the Government throughout our
territorial limits is reinstated so firmly that reflecting men, here and elsewhere, are convinced that the danger has passed never to return. The
result proves that the principles on which the Government rests have imparted to it a vitality that will cause it to endure for all time, in spite of
foreign invasion or domestic insurrection; and one of those principlesthe choicest one-is the right in cases of "criminal prosecution~ to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury," and in cases of treason to
the additional securities before adverted to. The great purpose of Magna
Charta and the Constitution was (to quote Story again) "to guard against
a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers, and against a
spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people." "The
appeal for safety can under such circumstances scarcely be made by innocence in any other manner than by the severe control of courts of justice,
and by the firm and impartial verdict of a. jury sworn to do right and
guided solely by legal evidence and a sense of duty. In such a course
there is a double security against the prejudices of judges, who may
p artalce of the wishes and opinions of the Government, and against the
passions of the multitude, who may demand their ,ictim with a clamorous
precipitancy." And Mr. Justice Blackstone, with the same deep sense of
its value, meets the prediction of a foreign writer, "that because Rome,
Sparta, and Carthage have lost their liberties, those of England in time
must perish," by reminding him, "that Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, at
t he time when their liberties were lost, were strangers to the trial by
jury," (3 Bia., 3'79.) That a right so valued, and esteemed by our
fathers to be so necessary to civil liberty, so important to the very existence of a free government, was designed by them to be made to depend
for its enjoyment upon the war power, or upon any power entrusted to
any department 0£ our Government, is a reflection on their intelligence
and patriotism•.
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IV. But to proceed : The articles of war, if they provided for the
punishment of the crimes on trial, and authorized such a court as this, do
not include such parties as are now on trial. .A.nd, until the rebellion, I
am not aware that a different construction was ever intimated. It is the
exclusive fruit of the rebellion.
The title of the act is, ".A.n act for establishing rules and articles for
the government of the armies of the United States."
The first section states "the following shall be the rules and articles by
which the armies of the United States shall be governed," and every
other section, except the 56th and 57th, arc, in words, confined to persons
belonging to the army in some capacity or other. I understand it to be
held by some, that because such words are not used in the two sections
rcfcrrcu to, it was the design of Congress to include persons who do not
belong to the army. In my judgment, this is a wholly untenable construction; but if it was a correct one, it would not justify the use sough"
to be made of it in this instance. It would not bring these parties for
their alleged crime before a military court known to the act ; certainly not
before a military commission-a court unknown to the act. The offence
charged is a traitorous conspiracy, and murder committed in pursuance of it.
Neither offence, conspiracy or murder, if indeed two are charged, is embraced by either the 56th or 57th articles of the statute. The 56th prohibits
the relieving "the enemy with money, victuals, or ammunition, or knowingly
harboring anu protecting him." Sophistry itself cannot bring the offences
in qnestion, under this article. The 57th prohibits only the "holding
correspondence with, or giving intelligence to the enemy, either directly
or indirectly." It is equally clear that the offences in question are not
within this provision. But, in fact, the two articles relied upon admit of
no such construction as is understood to be claimed. This is thought to
be obvious, not only from the general character of the act, and of all the
other articles it contains, but because the one immediately preceding, like
all those preceding and succeeding it, other than the 56th and 57th, includes only persons belonging to the "armies of the United States." Its
language is, "whosoever belonging to the armies of the United States,
employed in foreign parts," shall do the act prohibited shall suffer the prcscr:beu punishment. Now, it is a familiar rule of interpretation, perfectly
well settled, in such a case, that unless there be something in the following
sections that clearly shows a purpose to make them more comprehensive
than their immediate predecessor, they are to be construed as subject to
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the same limitation. So far from there being in this instance, any evidence
of a cli!fercnt purpose, the declared object of tl1c statute, as evidenced
by its title, its first section, and Hs general contents, are all inconsistent
with any other construction. .And when to this it is considered that the
po1rer exercised by Congress in passing the statute was merely the constitutional one to make rules for the gorernment and regulation of the
army, it is doing great injustice to that department lo suppose that in exercising it they designed to legislate for any other class. 'L'hc words, therefore
in the 55th article, "belonging to the armies of the United States," qualifying the immediate preceding word, "whosocnr," are applicable to the
56th and 57th, and equally qualify the same word "whosoever" al~o used
in each of them. And, finally, upon this point I am support ell by the
authority of Lientcnanl General Scott. The Commis,ion hare seen from
my previous reference to his autobiography that he placed his right to
issue his martial law order, establishing, amongst other things, military
commissions to try certain offences in a foreign country, upon tl1c ground
that otherwise they would go unpuni shed, and his army become demoralized. One of these offences was murder committed or attempted, and
for such an offence he tells us that the articles of war provided no court
for their trial and punishment, "no matter by whom or on whom committed." And this opinion is repeated in the 4th clause of his order, as
true of all the designated offences, "except in the very restricted case in
the 9th of the article."
, . There are other views which I submit to the serious attention of
the Commis,ion.

I. The mode of proceeding in a court like this, iwd which has been
pursued by the prosecution, with your approval, because deemed legal by
both, is so inconsistent with the proceedings of civil courts, as regulated
for ages by established law, that the fact, I think, demonstrates that persons not belonging to the army cannot be subjected to such a jurisdiction.
l. The character of the pleadings. The offence charged is a conspiracy
with persons not within the reach of the Court, and some of them in a
foreign country, to commit the alleged crime. 'ro give you jurisdiction,
the design of the accused and their co-conspirators is averred to have
been to aid the rebellion, and to accomplish that end not only by the murder of the President and Lieutenant General Grant, but of the Vice
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President and Secretary of State. It is further averred that the President being murdered, the Vice President becoming thereby President,
and as such Commander-in-Chief, the purpose was to murder him ; and as
in the contingency of the death of both, it ,rnnld be the duty of the Secretary of State to cause an election to he held for President and Vice
President, he was to be murdered in order to prevent a "lawful election"
of these officers; and that hy all these means, "aid and comfort" were to
be given "the insurgents engaged in armed rebellion against the United
States," and "the snbvrrsion and overthrow of the Constitution and laws
of the United States" thereby effected. 'l'hat such pleading as this
would not be tolerated in a civil court I suppose every lawyer will concede. It is argumentative, and even in that character unsound. The
continuance of our Govemmcnt docs not depend on the lives of any or
of all of its public servants. As fact or law, therefore, the pleading is
fatally defective. The Government has an inherent power to preserve
itself, which no conspiracy to murder or murder can in the slightest degree
impair. And the result which we have just witnessed proves this ancl
shows the folly of the madman and fiend by whose hands our late lamented
President fell. He, doubtless, thought that he had done a deed that would
subvert the "Constitution and lu.ws." ·we know that it has not had cvca
a tendency to that result. Not a power of the Government was sus•
pended ; all progressed as before the dire catastrophe. A cherished and
almost idolized citizen was snatched from us by the assassin's arm, but
there was no halt in the march of the Government. That continued in
all its majesty wholly unimpeded. 'fhc only elfect was to place the natio11
in tears and drape it in mourning, and to awake the sympathy and exeite
the indignation of the world.
II. But this mode of pleading renders, it would seem, inapplicable, the
rules of evidence known to the civil courts. It justifies, in the opinion of
the ,Judge Advocate and the Coul't, ( or what has been done would not have
been done,) a latitude that no civil court would allow, as in the judgment
of such a court the accused, however innocent, could not l1c supposed
able to meet it. Proof has been received not only of distiuct offences
from those charged, but of such offences committed by others than the
parties on trial. Even in regard to the party himself, other ofTe11ccs
alleged to have been previously committed by him cannot be prornd. At
one time a different practice prevailed in England, and docs now, it is,
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believed, in some of the Continental governments. But since the days of
Lord IIolt (a name venerated by lawyers and all admirers of enlightened
jurisprudence) it bas not prevailed in England. In the case of Harrison,
tried before that judge for murder, the counsel for the Government offered
a witness to prove some felonious design of the prisoner three years before. Holt indignantly exclaimed, "IIold ! hold! what are you doing
now? How can he defend himself from charges of which he has no
notice ? And how many issues are to be raised to perplex me and the
jury? Away ! away ! that ought not to be-that is nothing to the matter." (12 Stale Trials, 833-874.) I refer to this case not to assail
what has been done in these cases contrary to this rule, because I am
bound to iufer that before such a commission as this the rule has no legal
force. If, in a civil court, then, these parties would be entitled to the
benefit of this rule, one never departed from in such courts, they would
not have had proved against the1:1 crimes alleged to have been committed
by others, and having no necessary or legal connection with those charged.
With the same view, and not denying the right of the Commission in the
particular ease I am ahout to refer to, but to show that the Constitution
could not have designed to subject citizens to the practice, I cite the
same judge to prove that in a civil court those parties could not have been
legally fettered during their trial. In the case of Cranburn, accused as
implicated in the "assassination plot," on trial before the same judge,
Holt put an end to \\·hat Lord Campbell terms "the revolting practice of
trying prisoners in fetters." Hearing the clanking of chains, though no
complaint was made to him, he said, "I should like to know why tQe prisoner is brought in ironed." "Let them be instantly knocked off. When
prisoners arc tried they should stand at their case." (L3 State Trial1;,
221, 2d Campbell, Lites Chief Justices, 140.) Finally, I deny the
jurisdiction of the Commission not only because neither Constitution nor
laws justify, but, on the contrary, repudiate it, but on the ground that all
the experience of tlle past is against it. JEFFERSON, ardent in the prosecution of Burr, and solicitous for his conviction, from a firm belief of his
guilt, never suggested that be should be tried before any other than a
civil court. And in that trial, so ably presided over by MARSHALL, the
prisoner was allowed to "stand at his ease;" was granted every constitutional privilege, and no evidence was permitted to be given against him but
such as a civil court recognizes; and in that case as in this, the overthrow
of the Government was the alleged purpose, and yet it was not intimated
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in any quarter that he could be tried by a military tribunal. In England,
too, the doctrine on which this prosecution is placed is unknown. Attempts were made to assassinate George the Third and the present Queen,
and :Mr. Pcrci val, then Prime :Minister, was assassinated as he entered
the House of Commons. In the first two instances, the design was to
murder the commander-in-chief of England's army and navy, in whom,
too, the whole war power of the Government was also vested; in the last
a secretary, clothed with powers as great at least as those that belong to
our Secretary of State ; and yet in each the parties accused were tried
before a civil court, no one suggesting any other. Aud during the period
of the French Revolution, when its principles, if principles they can be
termed, were being inculcated in Eugland to an extent that alarmed the
Government and caused it to exert every power it was thought to possess to frustrate their efl'ect, when the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, and arrests and prosecutions resorted to almost without limit, no
one suggested a trial, except in the civil courts. And yet the apprehension of the G overnmcnt was, that the object of the alleged conspirators
was to sub~·ert its authority, bring about its overthrow, and subject the
kingdom to the horrors of the French Revolution, then shocking the
nations of the world. Hardy, llornc Took, and others were tried by civil
courts, and their names arc remembered for the principles of freedom
that were made triumphant mainly through the cfiorts of "that great
genius," in the words of a modern English statesman, (Ea,rl Russell,)
"whose sword and buckler protected justice and free<lom during the disastrous period;'' having "the tongue of Cicero and the soul of Ilampdeu, an invincible orator and an undaunted patriot."-Erskine.
As it was, these trials were conducted in so relentless a spirit, and, as
it was thought, with such disregard of the rights of the subject, that the
administration of the day were not able to withstand the torrent of the
people's indignation. What would ha,ve been their fate, individually as well
as politicn,lly, if the cases had been tried before a military commission,
aud life t<Lken? Can it be that in this particular an American citizen is
not entitled to all the rights that belong to a British subject? Can it be
that with us Executive power at times easts into the shade and renders all
other power subordinate ? .A.n American statesman, with a world-wide
reputation, long since gave answer to these inquiries. In a debate in the
Senate of the United States, in which he assailed what he deemed an unwarranted assumption of Executive power, he said, "the first object of a
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free people is the preservation of their liberties, and liberty is only to be
maintained by constitutional restraints and just divisions of political
power." "It docs not trust the amiable weaknesses of human nature,
and, therefore, will not permit power to overstep its prescribed limits,
though benevolence, good intent, and patriotic intent come along with it."
And he added, "Mr. President, the contest for ages has been to rescue
liberty from the grasp of Executive power." "In the long list of the
champions of hnman freedom there is not one name dimmed by the reproach of advocatiug the extension of Executive authority." Thoughts
so eloquently expressed appeal with subduing power to every patriotic
heart, and demonstrate that ·web tcr, if here, would be heard raising his
mighty voice against the jurisdiction of this Commission-a jurisdiction
placed npon Exeeuti,e authority alone. But it has been urged that
martial law warrants 8t1Ch a commission, and that such law prevails here.
The doctrine is believed to be alike indefensible and dangerous. It i
not, howe,·er, necessary to inquire whether martial law, if it did prevail,
woulcl maintain your jurisdiction, as it docs not prevail. It has never
been declared by any cornpetent authority, and the civil courts we know
arc in the full and unclisturbcd exercise of all their functions. We learn,
and the fact is donbtlcss true, that one of the parties, the very chief of
the alleged conspiracy, has been indicted, and is about to be tried before
one of those courts. If he, the alleged head and front of the conspiracy,
is to be and can be so tried, upon what ground of right, of fairness, or of
policy, can the parties who arc charged to have been his mere instruments
be deprived of the same mode of trial? It may be said that in acting
under this commission you are but conforming to an order of the Prcsiclcnt, which you arc bound to obey. Let me examine this for a moment.
If that order merely authorizes you to investigate the cases and report
the facts to him and not to pronounce a judgment, and is to that extent
legal, then it is because the President has the power himself, withont such
a proceeding, to punish the crime, and has only invoked your assistance
tu enable him to do it the more justly. Can this be so? Can it be that
the life of a citizen, however humble, be he soldier or not, depends in any
case on the mere will of the President? And yet it does, if the doctrine
be sound. What more dangerous one can be imagined? Crime is
defined by law and is to be tried 'and punished under the law. What is
murder, treason, or conspiracy, and what is admissible evidence to prove
either, arc all legal questions, and many of them, at times, diflicult of cor-
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rect solution. What the facts are may also present difficult inquiries.
To pass upon the first, the Constitution provides courts consisting of
judges selected for legal knowledge, aud made independent of Executire
power. Military judges are not so selected, and so far from lieing independent arc absolutely dependent on such po\\'cr. 'l'o pass upon the latter, it provides juries as being not likely to "partake of the wishes and
opinions of the Government." But if your fu11ction is only to ad as aids
to the President, to enable him to exercise his function of punishment,
and as he is under no ouligation by any law to call for such aid, he
may punish upon his own unassisted judgment, and without cve11 the
form of a trial. In conclusion, then, gentlemen, I submit that your rcsponsiuility, whatever that be, for error, in a proceeding like this, can
find no protection in Presidential authority. Whatever it be, it grows
out of the laws, and may, through the laws, he enforced. I suggested in
the outset of these remarks that that responsibility in one contingency
may be momentous. I recur to it again, disclaiming, as I did at first, the
wisli or hope that it woultl cause yon to be wanting in a single particular
of what you may beliere to Le your duty, but to obtain your best and
most matured judgment. The wish and hope disclaimed would be alike
idle and discourteous; and I trust the Commission will do me the justice
to belicYc that I am incapable of falling into either fault.
Responsibility to personal clanger can never alarm i,oldiers who have
faced, and will ever be willing in their country's defence to face death on
the battle-field. J311t there is a responsibility that e,·cry gentleman, be be
soldier or citizen, will constantly hold before him, and make him ponderresponsibility to the Constitution and laws of bis country and an intelligent public opinion-and prevent his doing anything knowingly that can
justly subject him to the censure of either. I have said that your responsibility is great. If the commission under which you act is void and confers no authority, whatever you may do ruay in vol vc the most serious personal liability. Cases have occurred that prove this. ltjs sufficient to
refer to one. J OSEPII WALL, at the time the offence charged against him
was committed, was Governor and commander of the garrison of Goree,
a dependency of England, in Africa. The indictment was for the murder
of Benjamin Armstrong, and the trial was had in January, 1802, before n
special court, consisting of Sir Archibald McDonald, Chief Baron of the
Exchequer; Lawrence, of the King's Bench, and Rocke, of the Common
Pleas. 'l'hc prosecution was conducted by Law, then Attorney General,

28
afterwards Lord Ellenborough. The crime was committed in l '782, and
under a military order of the accused, and the sentence of a regimental
court-martial. The defence relied upon was, that at the time the garrison
was in a state of mutiny, and that the deceased took n, prominent part in
it; that, because of the mutiny, the order for the court-martial was made,
n,nd that the punishment which was inflicted and said to have caused the
death was under its sentence. 'l'he offence was purely a military one, and
belonged to the jurisdiction of a military court, if the facts relied upon by
the accused were true, and its judgment constituted a valid defence. The
court, however, charged the jury, that if they found that there was no
mutiny to justify such a court-martial or its sentence, they were mid and
furnished no defence whatever. The jury so finding, found the accused
guilty, and he was soon after executed. (28 St. Tr., 51, 1'78.) The application of the principle of this case to the question I have considered is
obvious. In that instance want of jurisdiction in the court-martial was
held to be fatal to its judgment as a defence for the death that ensued
under it. In this, if the Commission has no jurisdiction, its judgment for
the same reason will be .of no avail, either to Judges, Secretn,ry of War
or President, if either shall be called to a responsibility for what mn,y be
done under it. .A.gain, upon the point of jurisdiction, I beg leave to add
that the opinion I have cndcaTorcd to maintain is believed to be the
almost unanimous opinion of the profession, and certainly is of every
judge or court who has expressed any.
In Maryland, where such commissions have been and are held, the
J udgc of the Criminal Court of Baltimore recently made it a matter of
special charge to the grand jury. Judge Bond told them : 'It has come
to my knowledge that here, where the United States Court, presided over
by Chief J usticc Chase, has always been unimpeded, and where the
Marshal of the United Slates, appointed by the President, selects the
jurors, irresponsible and unlawful military commissions attempt to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over citizens of this State, not in the military or
naval service of the United States, nor in the militia, who are charged
with olfcnccs either not known to the law, or with crimes for which the
mode of trial and punishment arc provided by statute in the courts of the
land. That it is not done hy the paramount authority of the United
States, your attention is directed to article 5, of the Constitution of the
United States, which sn,ys : 'no person shall be held to n,nswer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
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ment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger."
Such persons exercising such unlawful jurisdiction are liable to indictment by you, as well as responsible in civil actions to the parties.'
In New York, Judge Peckham, of the Supreme Court of that State, and
speaking for the whole bench, charged the grand jury as follows:
"The Constitution of the United States, Article 5, of the Amendments,
declares that 'no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when
in actual service in time of war or public danger.'
"Article 6 declares that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.'
"Article 3, section 2, declares that 'the trial of all crimes, except in
cases of impeachment, shall be by jury,' &c.
"These provisions were made for occasions of great excitement, no
matter from what cause, when passion rather than reason might prevail.
"In ordinary times, there would be no occasion for such guards, as
there would be no disposition to depart from the usual and established
modes of trial.
"A great crime has lately been committed that has shocked the civilized
world. Every right minded man desires the punishment of the criminals,
but he desires that punishment to be administered according to law, and
through the judicial tribunals of the country. No star chamber court, no
secret inquisition, in this nineteenth century, can ever be made acceptable
to the American mind.
"If none but the guilty could be accused, then no trial could be
necessary-execution should follow accusation.
"It is almost as necessary that the public should have undoubted faith
in the purity of criminal justice, as it is that justice should in fact be
administered with integrity.
"Grave doubts, to say the least, exist in the minds of intelligent men as
to the constitutional right of the recent military commissions at Washington, to sit in judgment upon the persons now on trial for their lives before
that tribunal. Thoughtful men feel aggrieved that such a commission
should be established in this free country, when the war is over, and when
the common law courts are open and accessible to admiuister justice
according to law, without fear or favor.
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"What remedy exists?
puhlie sentiment.

None whatever, except through the power of

"As citizens of this free country, having an interest in its prosperity
and good name, we may, as I desire to do, in all courtesy and kindness,
and with all proper respect, express our disapprobation of this course in
our rulers in iV a hington.
"'rhe unanimity with which the leading press of our land has condemned this mode of trial, ought to be gratifying to every patriot.
"Every citizen is interested in the preservation, iu their purity, of the
institutions of his country; and yon, gentlemen, may make such presentment on this subject, if any, as your judgment may dictate."
The reputation of both of these judges is well and favorably known, and
their authority is entitled to the greatest deference.
Even in France, during the consulship of Napoleon, the institution of a
military commission for the trial of the Prince Due d'Enhicn, for alleged
conspiracy against his life, was, to the irreparable injury of his reputation,
ordered by N apolcon. The trial was had, and the Prince was at once
convicted and executed. It brought upon Napoleon the condemnation
of the world, and is one of the blackest spots in his character. The case
of the Dnke, says the eminent historian of the Consulate and the Empire,
furnished Xapolcon "a happy opportunity of saving his glory from a
stain," which he lost, and adds, with philosophic truth, that it was "a
deplorable consequence of violating lhe ordinary forms ofjustice," and
further adds, "to defend social order by conforming to the strict rules
and j 01·ms of justice, without allowing any feeling of revenge to operate,
is the great lessen to be drawn from these tragical events."- Thier's
History, &c., 4 vol., 318-322.
Upon the whole, then, I think I shall not be cousidcrcd obtrusive if I
again invoke the Court to weigh well all that I have thought it my duty
to urge upon them. I feel the duty to be upon me as a citizen sworn to
do what I can to preserve the Constitution and the principles on which
it reposes. .As counsel of one of the parties, I should esteem myself dishonored, if I attempted to rescue my client from a proper trial for the
offence charged against her by denying the jurisdiction of the Commission
upon grountls that I did not conscientously believe to be souncl. .And in
what I have done, I have not more had in view the defence of Mrs.
Surratt, than of the Constitution and the laws. In my view, in this
respect, her cause is the cause of every citizen. .And let it not be sup-

posed tlrnt I am seeking to secure impunity to nny one who may have been
guilty of the horrid crimes of the night of the 14th of April. Over these
the civil courts of this District lrnvc nm pie jurisdiction, and will faithfully
exercise it if the cases arc remitted to them und guilt is legally establishld,
and will surely award the punishment known to the law~. God forbid
that such crimes should go unpunished! In the black catalogue of
offences, these will forever be esteemed the <larkest and deepest crer committed by sinning man. And in common with the ciYilizcd ,rorld, do I
wish that every legal punishment may be legally inflicted upon all who
participated in them.
A word more, gentlemen, and thanking you for your kind attention, I
shall have done. As you ham discovered, I hare not rcmarkcd on the
evidence in the case of 11:rR. Surratt, nor is it my purpose; I.Jut ii is proper
that I refer to her case in particular for a single moment. 'l'hat a woman
well educated, and as far as we can judge from all her past life us 11·c have
it in evidence, a devout Christian, ever kind, affectionate, a11d charitable,
with no motive disclosed to ns that could have can. c<l a total change in
her very nature, eonld have participated in the crimes in <1ucstion it i;;
almost impossible to believe. Such u belief can only be forced upon u.
reasonable, unsuspecting, unprrjudiccd mind by direct and uncontradicted
evidence, coming from pure and perfectly unsu1:1pcdcd sources. Rave we
these? Is the evidence uncontradictcd? Arc the two witnesses Weichmann and Lloyd, pure and unsuspected? Of the particulars of their evidence I say nothing. They will be brought before you by my associates.
But this conclusion in regard to these witnesses must he in the minds of
the Court, and is certainly strongly impressed npon my owu, that if the
facts which they themselves state as to their couuection and intimacy with
Booth and Payne are tii.1e, their knowledge of the purpose to commit the
crimes, and their participation in them, is much more satisfactorily established than the alleged knowledge aud participation of :Mrs. Snrratt. As
for, gentlemen, as I am concerned, her case is now in your hands.
JUNE

16, 1865.

REVERDY JOHNSON.

As associate counsel for Mrs. l\fary E. Surratt, we concur in the above.
FREDERICK A. AIKE~,
JOH~ W. CLAMPI'rT.

